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UNDERSTANDING WHY JUDGES AND 
JURIES DISAGREE ABOUT GUILT 
AMY FARRELL* & DANIEL GIVELBER**. 
A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial is premised 
in part on the view that a jury’s verdict of guilt or innocence may differ 
from that of a judge deciding the same case. 
Empirical research has confirmed that judges and juries do sometimes 
disagree about verdicts and that the direction of these disagreements is 
overwhelmingly in the direction of jury leniency.  In their seminal study, 
The American Jury, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel suggested that when 
cases are close on the evidence, juries are “liberated” from the dictates of 
the law, and can—and do—give expression to extralegal values in arriving 
at verdicts.  This explanation feeds the commonly held view that judges 
decide according to legal rules, but juries make decisions that reflect the 
values and sentiment of the community, even when those decisions are in 
opposition to the law.  This perspective has been supported by research 
primarily based on the perceptions of judges about how juries reach their 
verdicts.  Missing from our understanding of why judges and juries 
disagree is information from jurors about the factors that motivate their 
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verdicts in opposition to judges.  Data collected in four jurisdictions by the 
National Center for State Courts allows us to examine the question of judge 
and jury disagreement about guilt through a consideration of the views of 
jurors as well as judges.  Using this data, we test in a modern context the 
hypothesis that the jury’s embrace of values—as opposed to its different 
assessment of the evidence—explains why juries acquit when judges would 
convict.  We find that legal and extralegal factors affect both judge and jury 
decisions about guilt, that both sets of factors predict disagreement in 
different contexts, and the pattern of agreement versus disagreement is 
more complex than suggested by the liberation hypothesis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional right to a jury trial rests upon values in addition to 
the interest of accurate fact-finding.  When, at the height of the due process 
revolution, the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the 
United States Constitution required states to afford criminal defendants the 
right to a jury trial in a serious case, the Court did not base its ruling on the 
view that juries were more accurate fact-finders than judges.1  Rather, as it 
noted in Duncan v. Louisiana, the constitutional right to a jury trial in a 
serious criminal case reflected  
a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice 
administered.  A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent 
oppression by the Government . . . .  If the defendant preferred the common-sense 
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the 
single judge, he was to have it.2
The Court in Duncan found support for its view in empirical research on 
judge and jury decisionmaking.  
   
Responding to the objection that “juries are 
incapable of adequately understanding evidence or determining issues of 
fact, and that they are unpredictable, quixotic, and little better than a roll of 
dice”3 the Court referenced Kalven and Zeisel’s seminal study from The 
American Jury, stating: 
Yet, the most recent and exhaustive study of the jury in criminal cases concluded that 
juries do understand the evidence and come to sound conclusions in most of the cases 
presented to them and that when juries differ with the result at which the judge would 
have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the very purposes for 
which they were created and for which they are now employed.4
 
1 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).  
 
2 Id. at 155–56. 
3 Id. at 157. 
4 Id. at 157 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)).  
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Analyzing survey responses from over 500 judges presiding over 
3,000 criminal trials, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that when cases are close 
on the evidence, juries are “liberated” from the dictates of the law, and 
can—and do—give expression to extralegal values in arriving at verdicts.  
No other work of social science relating to jury behavior has been as widely 
cited or as approvingly referenced by courts.5  Kalven and Zeisel’s research 
has been cited in twenty-five different Supreme Court decisions (as well as 
more than 190 decisions of other courts)6
Kalven and Zeisel drew their conclusions about why juries disagreed 
with judges entirely from survey responses from judges about their 
perceptions as to why juries arrived at a different conclusion than they 
would have in the same case.
 as support for a proposition 
concerning the behavior of juries.  These citations are a tribute to the 
eminence of the authors, and to the breadth and sweep of their empirical 
and analytic work, as well as to the mostly reassuring message that judges 
are bound by legal rules, but juries can and do make decisions that reflect 
the values and sentiment of the community, even when those decisions are 
in opposition to the law. 
7  No attempt was made to verify that the 
conclusions of the judge about why the jury arrived at its verdict were in 
fact correct.  Additionally, research for The American Jury was conducted 
over fifty years ago at the dawn of the civil rights movement before the 
composition of police forces, judges, and juries began to reflect more 
accurately the race and gender of the general population.  It was conducted 
before DNA analysis exposed the vulnerability of previously uncontestable 
convictions in serious cases.  Their data also predated the constitutional 
revolution in how courts conduct criminal adjudication.8  The demographics 
of defendants in felony courts have also changed substantially since the 
time of Kalven and Zeisel’s study.9
 
5 Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 323 (1991). 
  While more recent research on jury 
6 This is the result of a search of Westlaw on January 10, 2010 employing the inquiry 
“Kalven w/3 of Zeisel." 
7 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, 45–54. 
8 Cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial), 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses), Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 479 (1986) (illegality of race-based jury challenges), Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 
(1975) (holding that a jury must reflect a cross-section of community; cannot exclude 
women as a class), In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose 
exculpatory evidence), as well as Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), were all 
decided after the Kalven and Zeisel survey. 
9 In the cases examined by Kalven and Zeisel, 73% of all defendants were white and the 
remaining 27% were black.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 195 tbl.60.  As of 2002, the 
felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties in U.S. were 31% white, 43% black, 
1552 FARRELL & GIVELBER [Vol. 100 
decisionmaking has generally supported the notion that the liberation 
hypothesis is “alive and well” in modern courts,10
Contemporary data from a four-city survey of criminal trials collected 
by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) affords an opportunity to 
advance our understanding of judge–jury disagreement beyond Kalven and 
Zeisel’s original findings.
 no studies have directly 
measured whether sentiments as reported by jurors explain judge–jury 
disagreements, and whether the effect of juror sentiment are most 
pronounced in cases where the evidence is close. 
11  Despite the dramatic changes in the American 
criminal justice system cited above, research using the NCSC data has 
found essentially the same rates of judge–jury disagreement as those 
identified by Kalven and Zeisel,12
II. EXPLAINING JUDGE AND JURY DISAGREEMENT 
 but important questions remain 
unanswered about the factors contributing to judge–jury disagreement about 
guilt.  The NCSC data includes information from both jurors who decided a 
case and the judge who presided over the trial, which allows us to 
investigate whether, and to what extent, the jury’s embrace of non-legal 
factors explains why judges and juries disagree about guilt in a modern 
context. 
In The American Jury, Kalven and Zeisel reported that when judges 
and juries disagreed, juries were far more likely to be lenient than judges.  
The authors identified three types of disagreements between judge and jury: 
(a) disagreement as to whether the defendant was guilty of any of the 
crimes for which he was on trial (66% of all disagreements), (b) 
disagreements between the judge and jury as to whether the defendant was 
guilty of some of the crimes with which he was charged (17% of all 
disagreements), and (c) disagreements between judge and jury in which the 
jury hangs as to one or more of the charges against the defendant (17% of 
all disagreements).13
 
24% Hispanic, and 2% “other.”  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at  454 tbl.5.52 (2002), available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5522002.pdf.  The percentage of defendants who are 
either female or under twenty-one has at least doubled: from 7% women in the 1950s to 18% 
in 2002, and from 9% of defendants who were twenty or younger in the 1950s to 18% in 
2002.  Id. 
  Each disagreement was in the same direction: the jury 
10 For a review see Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical 
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 700–01 (2001). 
11 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge–Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial 
Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 
(2005). 
12 Id. at 180–83. 
13 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 109. 
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was far more likely to be more lenient than the judge.  Thus, in 87% of the 
disagreements about guilt or innocence, the jury was more lenient than the 
judge was, and in 79% of the disagreements arising from a hung jury, the 
jury was more lenient than the judge.14
Relying solely upon the judge’s written explanation for why the jury 
arrived at a verdict with which he disagreed, Kalven and Zeisel identified 
five different explanations for disagreement.  They cited “evidence factors,” 
“facts only the judge knew,” “disparity of counsel,” “jury sentiment about 
the individual defendant,” and “jury sentiments about the law.”
 
15  
Weighting these factors, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that differing 
evaluations of the evidence accounted for 54% of all disagreements, 
sentiments about the law and the defendant for another 40%, and facts that 
only the judge knew and disparity of counsel the remaining 6%.16  From 
these findings, they suggest that the combination of values and evidence 
explained a significant number of judge–jury disagreements.  To understand 
the influence of these factors on jury decisions, they posited the “liberation 
hypothesis”17—that when the case was close on the evidence, the jury was 
“liberated” from the dictates of the law and could, and did, give expression 
to “sentiment”18 in arriving at its verdict.19
Kalven and Zeisel never stated explicitly that when judge and jury 
disagreed about guilt, the judge was factually correct and the jury in error.  
Rather, they employed metaphors that suggested this was the case.  Thus, 
 
 
14 See id. at 109 tbl.23. 
15 Id. at 106. 
16 Id. at 115 tbl.29.  
17 By “close” in this context, they apparently meant that the judge identified both value-
based and evidence-based reasons to explain why the jury acquitted when the judge would 
have convicted.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 166.  Although they did ask expressly 
about whether the case was “close” in their second survey (Question 12) involving 1,191 
responses, they did not ask this question in the initial survey involving 2,385 trials.  Id. at 49.  
Perhaps for this reason, while they employ the “closeness” variable from the second survey 
to provide a map of the evidence and to demonstrate that jury verdicts follow the evidence, 
id. at 134, 158–59,  they do not make substantial use of  that variable in their development of 
disagreement cases and the relative roles of values and evidence.  Id. at 163–64.  In a 
footnote, id. at 164 n.2, they present an apparently mislabeled table (they title it “Normal 
Disagreements” when the table only makes sense if it includes both “normal” and “cross-
over” disagreements) indicating the percentage of disagreements between judge and jury in 
clear and close cases.  They do so, the footnote indicates, to show that disagreement occurs 
in clear cases as well as close cases.  This is not a point they develop at any length in the 
text. 
18 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 165. 
19 As summarized in The American Jury, “The sentiment gives direction to the resolution 
of the evidentiary doubt; the evidentiary doubt provides a favorable condition for a response 
to the sentiment.  The closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the jury to respond to 
sentiment by liberating it from the discipline of the evidence.”  Id. at 165. 
1554 FARRELL & GIVELBER [Vol. 100 
the judge’s view of the case was a “baseline representing the law,”20 while 
the close cases in which the jury came to a different conclusion constituted 
a “war with the law,” albeit a “modest and subtle” one.21  They asserted, 
“[W]hen the jury reaches a different decision from the judge on the same 
evidence, it does so not because it is a sloppy or inaccurate finder of facts, 
but because it gives expression to values which fall outside the official 
rules.”22
Until recently, attempts to replicate Kalven and Zeisel’s findings in 
criminal trial decisions have been quite limited.
  This conclusion reflected the popularly understood genius of the 
jury system that tempers the rigors of the law with the common sense of the 
community. 
23  Most studies 
investigating the factors that inform judge and jury verdicts have relied 
upon comparisons of judge and jury verdicts in small samples of cases, 
interviews with decisionmakers about previous cases and experimental 
designs employing mock juries.  These methodologies have a number of 
strengths and limitations.  Judge–jury verdict comparisons from actual 
criminal trials necessarily involve the judge rendering a hypothetical 
judgment while the jury renders a real one.  It is possible that judges will be 
less meticulous in evaluating the evidence when it is not their responsibility 
to decide a case, and that what the jury has already done may influence the 
verdict that judges indicate they would render.24
 
20 Id. at 499. 
  However, reasoning from 
21 Id. at 495. 
22 Id.  Kalven and Zeisel also suggested “most but not all of the time” when juries agreed 
with judges, the jury was “not importing values of its own” into its decision about guilt or 
innocence.  Id. at 494.  Further, when juries and judges disagreed about guilt, they suggested 
“two-thirds of the disagreements with judges are marked by some jury response to values.”  
Id. at 495.  
23 Many of the studies comparing judge and jury decisions involve civil rather than 
criminal cases.  See Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A 
Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 477–78 (2005).  While these studies 
are informative, they do not truly represent the experience of judges and juries in the 
criminal justice system.  The burden of proof in a civil case is “more probable than not.”  In 
the civil setting, justice is achieved when the parties are afforded a fair process for making 
their case before a disinterested adjudicator.  Criminal justice seeks a higher end: that the 
court would ideally convict only those who actually committed the crime in question.  
Additionally, the law in many civil cases invites the decisionmaker to consult values in 
determining whether the defendant behaved appropriately (for example, was the defendant’s 
behavior unreasonable, was the product unreasonably dangerous?).  The very studies that 
demonstrate that juries are more lenient than judges in criminal cases also indicate that there 
is no particular direction to leniency in civil cases—when they disagree, it is as likely that 
the judge is more lenient than the jury as the other way around.  See Larry Heuer & Steven 
Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994). 
24 See Robbenolt, supra note 23, at 473–77. 
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other empirical approaches presents even greater challenges.  Archival 
studies such as post-judgment interviews with judges and juries about their 
decisionmaking processes often do not collect data from judges and juries 
in the same cases.25  Simulations and mock jury experiments also pose 
challenges since, no matter how realistic the presentation, the participants 
are aware that their decisions have no genuine consequences.26
A. THE ROLE OF EXTRA-EVIDENTIARY FACTORS ON JURY VERDICTS 
  Despite 
these challenges, research since The American Jury has advanced our 
understanding of the effect of evidentiary and extra-evidentiary factors on 
jury verdicts. 
Extra-evidentiary factors affect jury verdicts, but the contexts in which 
such factors exert influence are limited.  Research conducted in the 1980s 
using data from thirty-eight sexual assault cases found that juror decisions 
are dominated by evidentiary factors as opposed to victim or defendant 
characteristics and that juror attitudes have little explanatory power with 
respect to case outcomes.27  Further analysis of the same set of sexual 
assault cases suggests that when liberation based on juror sentiment did 
occur, it was only in those cases that were closest on the evidence.28  Other 
research has found that “case related” extra-evidentiary influences such as 
charge severity, pretrial publicity and trial complexity affect jury verdicts, 
but only when the evidence presented by the prosecution is ambiguous or 
weak.29  Measures of defendant characteristics such as race and 
attractiveness (traditionally categorized as indicators of jury sentiment) did 
not measurably affect jury verdicts under any evidentiary conditions.30
 
25 Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict Statistics: 
Cautions About the Lorelei’s Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599, 607–08 (1994). 
 
26 Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of 
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 445 (2005); Shari 
Seidman Diamond, Illumination and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 561, 564 (1997). 
27 Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987). 
28 Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal 
Factors in Jurors’ Decisions, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 423, 425–26 (1986).  Reskin and 
Visher measured juror sentiment by (1) assessment of the defendant’s attractiveness, (2) any 
reference to the defendant being employed or unemployed, (3) any negative comment about 
the victim’s moral character, and (4) juror perception of the victim’s responsibility for the 
assault.  They classified hard evidence as eyewitness testimony, physical evidence, 
recovered weapon, and physical injury to the victim. Id. 
29 Dennis J. Devine et al., Strength of Evidence, Extraevidentiary Influence, and the 
Liberation Hypothesis: Data from the Field, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 136, 142–43 (2009). 
30 Id. at 136, 144–45. 
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Recent reanalysis of the data originally collected by Kalven and Zeisel 
using more sophisticated multivariate regression analysis techniques called 
into question a central premise of Kalven and Zeisel’s hypothesis—the 
notion that evidentiary strength and juror sentiment were independent 
phenomena.  Reanalyzing Kalven and Zeisel’s data, Gastwirth and Sinclair 
found a strong relationship between a defendant’s lack of a criminal record 
and the perception of judges that jurors were sympathetic to the defendant.  
They further found that judges’ perceptions that jurors were sympathetic to 
defendants (actually brought about in part by the lack of criminal record) 
diminished after controlling for the severity of the cases.31
Because jurors are more likely than judges are to have demographic 
characteristics that may lead to identification with—and leniency toward—
defendants, extralegal factors such as defendant or juror race might be 
expected to influence jury decisions.
  These findings 
suggest that the liberation hypothesis may not actually work as Kalven and 
Zeisel posited.  Instead, the presence or absence of particular evidentiary 
factors may actually bring about juror sympathy for the defendant, 
necessitating methodologies that control for these factors independently. 
32  Numerous studies suggest a 
relationship between juror characteristics and jury leniency toward same-
race defendants,33 but this relationship appears strongest when the evidence 
supporting guilt is mixed or weak.34
 
31 Joseph L. Gastwirth & Michael D. Sinclair, A Re-examination of the 1966 Kalven-
Zeisel Study of Judge–Jury Agreements and Disagreements and Their Causes, 3 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 169 (2004). 
  Other jury research, however, suggests 
a more complex relationship between juror race, interpretation of evidence 
32 Data from the Capital Jury Project, a national study of capital jurors’ decisionmaking 
using interviews with more than 1,000 actual jurors from trials in fourteen states, indicates 
there are significant differences between black and white jurors in terms of their degree of 
doubt about guilt, perceptions of defendant remorse, and beliefs about the future 
dangerousness of the defendant.  See William Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and 
White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 J. 
CONST. L. 171, 190–91 (2001); see also DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1993); 
Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 545 (1989). 
33 Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1620 
(1985); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 597 (2006); Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in 
Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 136–43 
(1979). 
34 VALERIE P HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1991); Robert J. MacCoun & 
Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for 
Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1988). 
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and liberation,35 sometimes finding no measurable relationship between 
defendant and juror race and case outcomes.36
Those attempting to apply the liberation hypothesis to other criminal 
justice decisions, particularly sentencing, have achieved mixed results.
 
37  
Consideration of extralegal factors appears to be constrained when judges 
sentence offenders convicted of more serious crimes such as murder, rape 
and robbery, but these same judges appear “liberated” to consider extralegal 
factors such as race in sentencing decisions in less serious cases.38  There is 
only mixed support for the liberation hypothesis in the disposition of 
murder cases at various stages of the criminal justice process.  While victim 
characteristics affect the processing or murder cases, the effects are not 
clearly limited to a particular level of case severity.39
Principles from the liberation hypothesis have also been used in 
support of the argument that defendant and victim race significantly affects 
capital sentencing under conditions of less-than-clear defendant culpability 
and ambiguous evidence.
 
40  In an important study cited in McCleskey v. 
Kemp,41 Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski found the race of the victim 
predicted capital sentences only in those cases where the evidence 
supporting conviction was neither particularly strong nor particularly 
weak.42
 
35 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 
51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986). 
  Other studies, however, find that the effects of defendant and 
36 See Devine et al., supra note 30, at 145 (finding that defendant and foreperson race 
does not predict acquittal under any type of evidentiary condition). 
37 Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race, Homicide Severity, and Application of the 
Death Penalty: A Consideration of the Barnett Scale, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 511 (1989) (finding 
no support for the liberation hypothesis in their study of prosecutors’ decisions to request the 
death penalty in Kentucky and suggesting that considerations of defendant and victim race 
were not confined to legally ambiguous cases); cf. Eric Baumer et al., The Role of Victim 
Characteristics in the Disposition of Murder Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 281 (2000) (finding only 
mixed support for the liberation hypothesis in the disposition of murder cases at various 
stages of the criminal justice process and concluding that while victim characteristics affect 
the processing or murder cases, the effects are not clearly limited to a particular level of case 
severity). 
38 Cassia Spohn & Jerry Cederblom, Race and Disparities in Sentencing: A Test of the 
Liberation Hypothesis, 8 JUST. Q. 305, 322 (1991). 
39 Baumer et al., supra note 37, at 281. 
40 Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1327 (1985).  
41 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
42 David Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of 
the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). 
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victim race on decisions to seek the death penalty are not confined to 
legally ambiguous cases.43
B. PREDICTING JURY AND JUDGE DISAGREEMENT 
 
Despite attempts to apply principles of the liberation hypothesis to 
understand legal outcomes in the criminal justice system, there has been 
relatively little direct examination of the decisionmaking of judges 
compared to juries.  There are many reasons to anticipate juries would 
decide cases differently than judges.  Juries are “one-shot” versus repeat 
players.44  They are unlikely to be aware of the norms and expectations of 
court actors who have regular interactions and do not have the constraints 
that accompany repeated interactions.  They decide collectively rather than 
individually, are not legally trained, and are more likely than the judiciary 
to be ethnically diverse.  On the other hand, being novices and under the 
direction of the judge, they may also respond in their verdict to both verbal 
and nonverbal cues provided by the judge.45
Despite these differences, judges and juries are often in agreement 
about the outcome of legal cases.
 
46  When juries do disagree with judges, 
the research has demonstrated consistently, it is in the direction of greater 
leniency towards the defendant.  The NCSC’s four-jurisdiction study of 
criminal trials found that the rates at which judges and juries agreed today 
resemble those reported by Kalven and Zeisel fifty years ago.47
 
43 Keil & Vito, supra note 
  Judges and 
juries in the NCSC data agreed on conviction in 64% of the cases 
(compared to 62% agreement on conviction found by Kalven and Zeisel) 
and agreed on acquittal in 14% of the cases (compared to 13% found by 
Kalven and Zeisel).  The jury acquitted when the judge would have 
convicted in 19% of the cases (the same proportion identified by Kalven 
and Zeisel) and the jury convicted when the judge would have acquitted in 
37. 
44 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). 
45 Peter D. Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges’ and Juries’ 
Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 775 (1991); Ann Burnett & Diane Badzinski, Judge 
Nonverbal Communication on Trial: Do Mock Trial Jurors Notice?, 55 J. COMM. 209 
(2005). 
46 Robbennolt observed,  
The most notable conclusion to be drawn from this emerging literature is that the decisionmaking 
of judges and jurors is strikingly similar.  While there is evidence of some differences, there is a 
high degree of agreement between the groups, they appear to decide real cases quite similarly, 
and they show a great deal of similarity in responding to simulated cases designed to examine a 
variety of legal decisionmaking processes. 
See Robbenolt, supra note 23, at 502. 
47 Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 180–83. 
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only 3% of the cases (compared to 6% identified by Kalven and Zeisel).48  
They also found that holding the strength of the case constant, juries were 
more likely to acquit than judges.49  This was true whether one employs the 
judge or the jury’s assessment of the strength of the evidence.  This finding 
confirmed Kalven and Zeisel’s best-known observation—that judges appear 
to have a lower conviction threshold than juries—but leaves open the 
question of why this is so.  Are jurors prone to acquittal in the sense that 
they either are moved by sentiment or are unduly credulous while the judge 
responds objectively to fact?  Alternatively, are judges prone to conviction 
in the sense that they cannot accurately identify the innocent in any but the 
most obvious case?50  Research using the NCSC data indicates that jurors 
are more attuned than judges to features of the defense case.  Whether the 
defendant produced a witness to support his version of events, whether or 
not the defendant had a criminal record, and whether he refused to plead 
guilty on the ground that he is innocent affect juror willingness to acquit, 
but have little impact on the judge’s evaluation of the case.51
The NCSC investigation expanded significantly upon the kinds of 
information collected and analyzed in The American Jury.  The NCSC 
survey secured information from individual jurors about the factors that 
informed their decision—particularly their assessments of the evidence and 
their sentiments about the law and the defendant.  These questions, coupled 
with those dealing with the nature of the evidence and the strength of the 
case, provide a basis for attempting to determine whether Kalven and 
Zeisel’s explanation for judge–jury disagreement finds support among 
today’s jurors.  More significantly, the NCSC data permits an examination 
of the factors that lead judges and juries to agree about guilt and innocence 
as well as those that lead to disagreement.  The data cannot tell us whether 
any of these decisions are factually correct but it can provide a basis for 
determining whether the factors that are associated with these outcomes are 
logically related to decisions about guilt or innocence. 
 
 
48 Id. at 181. 
49 Id.; Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse 
from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249 
(2003). 
50 The NCSC data has also been used in other scholarship to measure the probability that 
that jury decisionmaking may be prone to either type I (jury incorrectly convicts the 
innocent) and type II error (jury acquits the guilty).  See, e.g., Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating 
the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 305 (2007). 
51 Daniel Givelber & Amy Farrell, Judges and Juries: The Defense Case and Differences 
in Acquittal Rates, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 39–44 (2008). 
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C. THE CURRENT STUDY: UNDERSTANDING JUDGE AND JURY 
DISAGREEMENT 
The current study examines the influence of a range of factors, 
including measures of evidence and jury sentiment, on judge and jury 
agreement or disagreement about a defendant’s guilt.  We measure the 
effect of these factors under conditions in which decisionmakers (examined 
separately for judges and juries) indicate the case is close on the evidence 
compared to cases that are not deemed close.  In so doing, we are able to 
test directly in actual criminal trials the “liberation hypothesis” that, in close 
cases, sentiment moves juries but not judges to find defendants not guilty.  
Our analysis does not test what Kalven and Zeisel actually found—that 
judges explain jury disagreements by suggesting that juries are moved by 
values rather than facts.  (We do not test this contention directly because the 
judge was not asked to explain why she disagreed with the jury verdict; 
rather, the judge and jurors responded independently to different 
questionnaires concerning the importance of various evidentiary and non-
evidentiary factors in the case that the jurors had just decided.)  The 
liberation hypothesis, however, stands for a proposition grander than how 
judges explain disagreements.52
 
52 Interestingly, the NCSC data analyzed in the present study suggests judges may not be 
adroit at predicting how the jury will decide a case, casting some doubt on the ability of 
judges to understand why juries may disagree with the verdicts they would have rendered.  
Asking judges to predict how the jury would decide the case and comparing those responses 
to the verdict the jury actually rendered (excluding hung juries), the NCSC data indicates 
that judges accurately predicted the jury’s decision 81% of the time (214 out of 264 cases).  
Judges were more proficient at predicting convictions than acquittals.  The jury behaved as 
the judge predicted 86% of the time (161 out of 187 cases) when the judge thought the jury 
would convict but only 69% of the time (53 out of 77 cases) when the judge predicted the 
jury would acquit. 
  It holds that in close cases juries are more 
lenient than judges because jurors render decisions based on their feelings 
about the law and the defendant.  In this analysis, we test two hypotheses 
central to the premises of the liberation hypothesis: first, that jury sentiment 
distinguishes cases where judges and juries disagree about guilt; and 
second, that sentiment has the strongest effect on judge and jury 
disagreement in cases that are close on the evidence.  This inquiry is 
important because the claim that juries are moved by personal sentiment to 
acquit those whom the judge views as guilty fuels the perception that a “not 
guilty” verdict is less of an assessment of whether the defendant is actually 
innocent than it is a response to legally irrelevant factors.  This presumption 
contributes to the view that “they are all guilty of something,” even if the 
state cannot prove it in court. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data used to answer these questions was originally collected and 
analyzed by the National Center for State Courts as part of a study on hung 
juries.53  For the hung jury study, the NCSC collected information from trial 
courts in the Central Criminal Division of the Los Angeles County Superior 
Court, California; the Maricopa County Superior Court (Phoenix), Arizona; 
the Bronx County Supreme Court, New York; and the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia between 2000 and 2001.54  Data was collected on non-
capital felony trials in each jurisdiction.  The data from this study includes 
case information about the nature of the charges, demographic information 
on the offender and victim(s), voir dire, trial evidence and procedures, and 
jury deliberations for 289 separate criminal cases.55  In addition to case 
information, questionnaires were submitted to the presiding judge and to the 
prosecution and defense attorneys to elicit information about their 
perceptions of the case proceedings and outcomes.  Individual jurors in each 
case also completed questionnaires about their perceptions of the evidence 
and testimony presented at trial, the deliberation process, and the outcome 
of the case.56
 
53 PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL 
AND SOC. RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF HUNG JURIES IN BRONX COUNTY, NEW YORK, LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY CALIFORNIA, MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, AND WASHINGTON D.C., 
2000–2001 (2002), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3689. 
  These additional sources of data provide a unique opportunity 
to examine the sources of judge–jury disagreement, and may even provide 
some indication of whether the judge or the jury provides the more reliable 
judgment as to whether the accused is guilty.  The data utilized here also 
overcomes many limitations of previous research, particularly expanding 
54 According to the authors of the original study, sites were chosen based on a 
convenience sample.  Some attention was given to sites with particular concerns about hung 
juries.  For a detailed description of the sampling and study design, see id. 
55 The dataset originally included 394 cases.  Thirty-two cases with no case disposition 
information, twenty-nine cases with no indication of how the judge would have decided the 
case, and twenty cases with missing data relevant to measures in our present inquiry were 
excluded from the analysis.  An additional twenty-eight cases where the jury hung on all 
charges were also removed for the present analysis.  Consistent with the approach of Kalven 
and Zeisel, our analysis focuses on the cases in which the jury either acquits the defendant of 
all charges or convicts him of at least one charge.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 60.  
56 Individual questionnaires were completed by jurors serving in each case.  A total of 
3,497 juror surveys were completed for the 394 cases (80% response rate).  Since the present 
analysis is conducted at the case level, individual juror responses were averaged for all jurors 
in each case to create aggregate jury responses. 
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the analysis to multiple case types across four courts throughout the 
country.57
To test the effect of juror sentiment in those cases where judges and 
juries disagree on the outcome of the case, we construct a series of 
multinomial regression models to compare the effects of legal and 
extralegal variables on judge and jury agreement and disagreement.  We 
measure agreement and disagreement as (1) agreement on guilt; (2) 
agreement on acquittal; (3) disagreement on acquittal, where a judge would 
convict but the jury acquits; and (4) disagreement on guilt, where a judge 
would acquit but the jury convicts.  We utilize multinomial logistic 
regression, an extension for binary logistic regression because our outcome 
is categorical and has more than two levels.  Multinomial regression 
provides a set of coefficients for each of the comparison groups.  The 
coefficients for the reference group are zeros, similar to the reference group 
for a dummy coded variable.  Through this analysis, we seek to understand 
if differences between judge and jury outcomes are explained by the notion 
that judges are guided by “facts” and juries by “sentiments” or whether 




  To specifically 
test the liberation hypothesis that when the evidence is close, jury sentiment 
predicts juror acquittal when judges would convict, we partition our data 
and present multinomial models predicting judge and jury agreement in 
cases (a) that judges indicate are close on the evidence compared to cases 
that judges believe are not close; and (b) that juries indicate are close on the 
evidence compared to those cases that juries believe are not close. 
1. Outcome Measures 
In the present analysis, we measure the effect of jury sentiment on four 
possible case outcomes: (a) judge and jury agree on conviction, (b) judge 
and jury agree on acquittal, (c) judge would convict, but the jury acquits, 
and (d) judge would acquit, but jury convicts.  We created the outcome 
variable by combining information on the actual verdict rendered by the 
juries in each of the 289 cases analyzed here with information provided by 
 
57 Despite this advantage, the four courts analyzed here are all in urban areas limiting our 
ability to draw conclusions concerning judge and jury disagreements in suburban or rural 
areas. 
58 The original NCSC data collected case-level information from court records, judges, 
attorneys, and individual level juror information from each juror participating in a case.  
Since multiple juror responses are nested in the case-level data in the original NCSC data, 
we aggregated all juror responses to represent the average juror response for each case to 
facilitate the use of multinomial regression modeling at the case level. 
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judges about the verdict they would render if the case had been decided in a 
bench trial.  We then recoded case outcomes into separate dummy variables 
where one equals the specified judge–jury agreement outcome and zero 
equals another outcome.  Since multinomial regression models predict a set 
of coefficients for each of the outcome groups compared to a reference 
category, we use judge and jury agreement on conviction as the reference 
category against which to test the predictors of when a judge and jury agree 
on acquittal, when a jury acquits when the judge would convict, and when a 
jury convicts when judge would acquit. 
Consistent with the approach of Kalven and Zeisel,59
2. Independent Measures 
 our analysis 
focuses on the cases in which the jury either acquits the defendant of all 
charges or convicts him of at least one charge.  If jurors are driven by 
sentiment when they disagree with the judge about guilt in close cases, one 
would expect to find confirmation of this explanation in those cases in 
which the disagreement is starkest—when judge and jury come to opposite 
conclusions as to whether the defendant engaged in any criminal behavior.  
It is possible that those who are convicted of some but not all charges may 
be benefitting from jury sentiment, but the data provides no way to 
characterize which mixed verdicts should be treated as counterfactual 
“wins” for the defense and which should not.  We eschew attempting to 
characterize some mixed verdicts as “defendant wins” and others as 
“prosecution wins” and instead treat all cases in which the defendant is 
convicted of any count as a conviction.  For the same reason, we have 
omitted cases in which the jury hangs on all counts. 
Kalven and Zeisel attributed nearly 60% of the disagreements in which 
the jury was more lenient than the judge to evidentiary factors and 40% to 
jury sentiment about the law and the defendant.60
 
59 Kalven and Zeisel treated disagreements between judge and jury with respect to guilt 
on various charges or penalty as “agreements to convict.”  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 
  To account for these 
4, 
at 60.  Thus, their famous Table 11 setting forth the basic pattern of judge–jury agreement 
treats every case in which the jury convicted on any count as representing a case in which 
the jury agreed with the judge that the defendant should be convicted.  Id. at 56 tbl.11. 
60 Id. at 115 tbl.29.  “Sentiments about the defendant” includes all reasons for 
disagreement “attributable to the personal characteristics of the defendant.”  “Sentiments 
about the law” refers to “particular instances of ‘jury equity,’ reasons for disagreement that 
imply criticism of either the law or legal result.”  Id. at 107.  Noting that it is “surprisingly 
difficult to give a thumbnail sketch of evidence as a category of judge–jury disagreement,” 
the authors indicate that “closeness of the case,” “differing requirements for proof,” and 
“different interpretations of evidence” are all examples of the kinds of reasons assigned to 
that category.  Id. at 106.  Disparity of counsel and facts known only to the judge accounted 
for 4% and 2% of disagreements respectively.  Id. at 115 tbl.29. 
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important and distinct factors, we created a series of variables that measure 
aspects of both phenomena.61
3. Evidentiary Factors 
 
“Quantity of the evidence” variables provide objective measures of the 
evidence admitted in trial by either the prosecution or defense.  The original 
NCSC data includes separate counts of the number of witnesses and number 
of exhibits presented by the prosecution and defense.  To measure the 
magnitude of the evidence presented by either the prosecution or defense, 
we combined measures of witnesses and exhibits to create additive 
measures of the total number of prosecution exhibits and witnesses and the 
total number of defense prosecution exhibits and witnesses. 
We also include factors that relate directly to the defendant’s case.  
Recent research suggests that the quality of the defense case may be more 
important than the quantity of witnesses or exhibits presented.  When the 
defense puts forward no witnesses or the defendant testifies alone, the jury 
is much more likely to convict than when a defense witness or witnesses 
testify particularly if the defendant also testifies.62
The defendant’s criminal history is another important component of 
the quality of the defense case.  Defendants without criminal records are 
less likely to be convicted than those with criminal records, even when the 
jury does not learn of the criminal history during the course of the trial.
  To account for this 
variation we include a dummy variable for the quality of the defense case.  
A weak case is coded 0 and measured as no witnesses testifying (33%) or 
only the defendant testifying alone (18%).  A strong defense case is coded 1 
and measured as a defense witness testifying either alone (24%) or in 
combination with the defendant (28%). 
63
 
61 In Kalven and Zeisel’s study, sentiments about the defendant included reasons for 
disagreement that were attributable to the personal characteristics of the defendant while 
sentiments about the law referred to “particular instances of ‘jury equity,’ reasons for 
disagreement that imply criticism of either the law or the legal result.”  Id. at 107. 
  
Information on the defendant’s criminal history is captured in the original 
NCSC data in a variable indicating whether the jury learned about a 
defendant’s criminal history (measured as yes, the jury learned about the 
record, no, the jury did not learn about the record, or no criminal history 
62 The defense offered testimony (either that of the defendant or a witness) in 85% of the 
cases in which the defendant had no criminal record; the defendant himself testified in 68% 
of all such cases.  Since a defendant is entitled to put his character in issue, the jury would 
have learned of the lack of a criminal record in all cases in which the defendant testified and 
would have likely learned of it in the remaining cases in which a witness other than the 
defendant testified.  Givelber & Farrell, supra note 51, at 38 tbl.1. 
63 Ronald A. Farrell & Victoria Lynn Swigert, Prior Offense Record as a Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecy, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 437, (1978). 
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record).  We recoded this variable into a dummy variable measuring 
whether a defendant had a criminal history coded as 0 (regardless of 
whether the jury learned about the record or not) and 1 when the defendant 
did not have a criminal record. 
The defendant’s claim of innocence also predicts disagreements 
between the judge and jury.64  While the defendant’s insistence upon 
innocence as a reason for not accepting a plea has no direct analogue in the 
Kalven and Zeisel typology, it has been included in the present analysis as 
indicative of the defense case.65
4. Jury Sentiment 
  The NCSC survey asked lawyers to 
explain why the case had not ended in a plea bargain.  This open-ended 
question was coded into common response categories, including: (1) 
because the defendant claimed he was innocent, (2) because the defendant 
refused to plead, (3) because no offer was made, and (4) because the parties 
could not agree on an appropriate plea.  This is information that may or may 
not come to the attention of the judge if she inquires about the defendant’s 
willingness to plead but would not be presented to the jury as relevant to the 
question of whether the defendant committed the crime.  The reason for the 
failure of the plea was recoded in the present analysis as a dummy variable 
coded as 0 when the failure of a plea was any other reason besides the 
defendant’s claim of innocence and 1 when the defendant claimed he was 
innocent. 
Kalven and Zeisel explained 40% of the disagreement when juries 
were more lenient than judges in terms of the jury’s beliefs about the 
defendant and about the law.  The NCSC study attempted to explore the 
latter issue by asking jurors, “How fair do you believe the law was in this 
case?” and “How fair would you say the legally correct outcome was?”  
These questions were all measured on seven-point scales, recoded to 
indicate scores of 1 represented the lowest assessment (i.e. least unfair) and 
7 represented the highest assessment (i.e. most unfair).66
 
64 Id. at 438. 
  The survey asked 
65 Information on the reason a plea was rejected was missing for 56 of the 289 cases 
analyzed here.  To provide the most conservative measure of the effect of defendants 
asserting their innocence in refusing the plea, we have recoded the missing values as 0 
indicating the defendant did not assert innocence in the decision to reject a plea.  It is 
possible in some of these cases no plea was offered. 
66 Questions about the fairness of the law and the legal outcome were originally coded in 
the opposite direction where 1 indicated the most unfair and 7 indicated the least unfair.   To 
provide consistency across the sentiment measures, we reverse-coded the fairness measures 
so the highest scores indicate the feeling that the law was the most unfair in order to parallel 
the coding of feelings that the defendant was treated too harshly or that the jury felt 
sympathy for the defendant. 
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jurors another set of questions designed to measure sentiment toward the 
defendant.  These included: “To what extent were you worried about the 
consequences to the defendant of a conviction by this jury?” and “How 
much sympathy did you feel for the defendant?”  Questions about juror 
sentiment toward the defendant were also measured on a seven-point scale 
where scores of 1 indicated the lowest assessment (i.e. least sympathy, least 
worried about consequences) and scores of 7 indicated the highest 
assessment (i.e. most sympathy, most worried about consequences).  To 
assess the effect of individual juror sentiment on case outcomes, we 
aggregated the data from individual juror questionnaires in each case to 
represent an average jury response for each case.  A score measuring 
sentiment toward the law was created by taking the mean of the available 
score for questions about the fairness of the law and fairness of the legal 
outcome (alpha=.75).  A separate score measuring sentiment toward the 
defendant was created by taking the mean of scores for questions about 
juror sympathy toward the defendant and concern about the consequences 
of conviction (alpha=.72). 
5. Race of Defendant and Jurors 
Though objective indicators of defendant characteristics do not, by 
themselves, necessarily result in particular jury sentiments, Kalven and 
Zeisel included judicial references to the characteristics of the defendants 
within the category of jury sentiment in their typology of reasons for judge–
jury disagreement.  Primary among these characteristics were the race, 
gender, and age of the defendant.67
 
67 Defendant race was categorized by Kalven and Zeisel as “White” or “Negro.”  In cases 
where judges thought disagreement with the jury was based on jury sentiment toward the 
defendants, the judge indicated sympathy was felt toward white defendants, female 
defendants and the youngest and oldest defendants.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 
  Information on the race and gender of 
the defendant was found in the NCSC case record data.  Defendants were 
classified originally as white non-Hispanic (10%), white Hispanic (25%), 
black non-Hispanic (55%), black Hispanic (3%), Asian (1%), or another 
race (5%).  We created dummy variables measuring whether a defendant 
was black (coded 0 for white non-Hispanic, black Hispanic, white Hispanic, 
Asian, and other racial groups and 1 for black non-Hispanic), which is 
included in the analysis to control for the effect of the defendants’ race.  
Information was collected on defendant gender, but only 8% of all 
defendants were female.  As a result, given the relatively small number of 
cases that included female offenders (28 out of 289), there was too little 
4, at 211 
tbl.65. 
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variation in defendant gender to include in subsequent analyses.  The NCSC 
survey did not collect information concerning the defendant’s age. 
In addition to measuring the effect of a defendant’s race on judge–jury 
agreement, aggregate measures of the race of the jury were included in the 
analysis.  The racial composition of the jury is measured here as the 
proportion of each jury that identify as being black. 
6. Closeness of Case 
The NCSC questionnaires to both judge and jury asked the question, 
“All things considered, how close was the case?” on a seven-point scale 
ranging from “evidence strongly favors prosecution” to “evidence strongly 
favors defense.”  Responses at the beginning of the range (1–2) indicate the 
evidence favored the prosecution and responses at the end of the range (6–
7) indicate the evidence favored the defense.  Responses in the middle of 
the seven-point range (3–5) indicate the case was close—it neither favored 
the prosecution or the defense.  To provide a simplified measure of the 
closeness of the case we created a dummy variable in which responses 1–2 
or 6–7 were coded as 0 (indicating the evidence in the case favored either 
the prosecution or the defense) and responses 3–5 were coded as 1 
indicating the case was close.68
7. Severity of Charge 
 
The NCSC data provides information on the type of offense charged 
for each count in each case.  Sixteen offense types were included in this 
data.  To control for the effect of different types of charges, we created an 
eight-point classification scale corresponding to the most serious offense 
charged where 1= murder, manslaughter, and attempted murder, 2= rape 
and robbery, 3= aggravated assault, weapons offense, and child abuse, 4= 
burglary, 5= drug distribution or sales, 6= drug possession, 7= larceny and 
theft, and 8= other less severe crimes.  Drug offenses were the most 
common offense, representing the most serious charge in 27% of the cases. 
8. Location 
Data was collected on criminal cases in four separate courts, the 
Central Criminal Division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, 
California; the Maricopa County Superior Court (Phoenix), Arizona; the 
 
68 Objective measures of the quantity of the evidence and judge or jury perceptions of 
case closeness do not appear to measure the same phenomena.  The correlation between the 
objective measures of the quantity of the evidence (the number of witnesses and number of 
exhibits presented) and judge or jury perceptions of closeness of the case is weak and non-
significant. 
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Bronx County Supreme Court, New York; and the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia.  To control for the differences that may exist between 
the courts, we created dummy variables indicating whether the case 
originated or not in each of the four courts. 
IV. FINDINGS 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for outcome and independent 
measures for the 289 cases analyzed here.  Sixty-four percent (185 out of 
289) of the cases resulted in agreement between the judge and the jury on 
conviction, 13% (37 out of 289) resulted in the judge and jury agreeing on 
acquittal, 17% (49 out of 289) resulted in the jury acquitting when the judge 
would have convicted and 6% (18 out of 289) resulted in the jury 
convicting when the judge would have acquitted.  As Eisenberg et al. 
reported, the direction of judge–jury disagreement has remained unchanged 
since Kalven and Zeisel69—juries acquit when judges would have convicted 
more often than they convict when judges would have acquitted.  In more 
than forty years, there has been practically no difference between the rate of 
judge–jury agreement as to who is guilty (the jury agrees with the judge 
when she would have convicted 79% of the time in both the NCSC data and 
Kalven and Zeisel’s study).  Today, however, there is a more substantial 
difference in the rate at which they agree about acquittals.  Juries in the 
NCSC study agree with the judge when she would have acquitted only 67% 
of the time compared to 86% of the time in the Kalven and Zeisel study.70
 
69 Eisenberg et al., supra note 
  
11. 
70 Kalven and Zeisel presented their findings concerning judge–jury agreement in two 
important tables, Tables 11 and 12, which differed only in terms of their treatment of hung 
juries.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 56 tbl.11, 58 tbl.12.  Kalven and Zeisel’s Table 11 
showed the extent of judge–jury agreement in cases in which the jury convicted, acquitted, 
or hung.  Id. at 56 tbl.11.  Their Table 12 collapsed the jury verdict categories from three to 
two by treating cases in which the jury hung as though half of them ended in convictions and 
half of them were acquittals.  Id. at 58 tbl.12.  While a table presenting judge–jury agreement 
with respect to convictions and acquittals only is easier to follow than one including hung 
juries, Kalven and Zeisel never presented a serious rationale for dividing the hung juries 
between guilty verdicts and acquittals as opposed to simply omitting them.  Kalven and 
Zeisel made this decision on the advice of an experienced prosecutor who estimated that 
about half of the time trials that ended in a hung jury eventually resulted in a conviction 
while the other half were either never retried or resulted in acquittal.  See id. at 57–58. n.4. 
 We were unable to find any data concerning what happened to those defendants whose 
trial ends in a hung jury for the NCSC study sites.  Research suggests retrials result mostly in 
convictions.  See, e.g., PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 26–27 (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/ 
Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf (finding that in nine counties nearly 
70% of the small number of hung cases that were re-tried resulted in conviction).  We chose 
to omit hung juries for the presentation of our findings since the focus of our inquiry is to 
understand what happens in cases in which judges and juries disagree about guilt and there is 
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In contrast to the judge–jury agreement reported by Kalven and Zeisel, 
contemporary jurors are more likely to agree with a judge’s decision to 
convict than they are to agree with a judge’s decision to acquit. 
The 289 cases examined here are evenly distributed across the four 
court sites with 21% in Los Angeles, 26% in Maricopa County, 26% in the 
Bronx, and 27% in Washington D.C.  Fifty-five percent of the defendants 
are black and on average 26% of the jury is black.  In half of the cases, the 
defense presents a witness testifying either alone or in combination with the 
defendant.  Overall, however, the prosecution presents more witnesses and 
exhibits than the defense.  On average, the prosecution presents 22.36 
witnesses and exhibits compared to 6.27 on average for the defense.  In 
 
 
no reason to assume that half of the trials that end in hung juries are “actually” acquittals.  
The table below presents the findings from Kalven and Zeisel’s Table 12 as it would look if 
recalculated to exclude hung juries as well as the comparable data from the NCSC survey.  
The italicized percentages illustrate the degree that the jury agrees with the judge’s 
assessment of guilt or innocence. 
 
Comparison of Judge–Jury Outcomes in NCSC Data to Kalven and Zeisel’s Data (Excluding 
Hung Juries) 
Kalven and Zeisel Jury Acquits Jury Convicts Total 
Data %  (N) %  (N) %  (N) 
Judge Acquits 14.2% (479) 2.3% (79) 16.5% (558) 
 85.8% 14.2% 100% 
Judge Convicts 17.9% (602) 65.6% (2,217) 83.5% (282) 
 21.4% 78.6% 100% 
Total 32.0% (1,081) 68% (2,296) 100% (3,379) 
    
NCSC Data Jury Acquits Jury Convicts Total 
 %  (N) %  (N) %  (N) 
Judge Acquits 12.8% (37) 6.2% (18) 19.0% (55) 
 67.2% 32.7% 100% 
Judge Convicts 16.9% (49) 64.0% (185) 81.0% (234) 
 20.9% 79.1% 100% 
Total 29.8% (86) 70.2% (203) 100% (289) 
 
 As it turns out, our finding that the direction of judge–jury agreement has changed holds 
true regardless of whether one excludes hung juries entirely (as we do here) or keeps hung 
juries in the calculation or divides hung juries between convictions and acquittals as did 
Kalven and Zeisel. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Measures of Outcome and Independent Variables (n = 289) 
 Case outcome 
Agree conviction 64.0% (185) 
Judge convicts, jury acquits 17.0% (49) 
Agree acquittal 12.8% (37) 
Judge acquits, jury convicts 6.2% (18) 
 Site 
Los Angeles 21.4% (62) 
Maricopa 25.9% (75) 
Bronx 26.2% (76) 
D.C. 26.5% (76) 
 Defendant race 
Non-black 45.0% (130) 
Black 55.0% (159) 
 Quality of defense 
No witnesses or defendant testifies alone 50.3% (145) 
Witness testifies alone or with defendant 49.7% (144) 
 Criminal record 
Defendant has a criminal record 79.2% (229) 
Defendant does not have criminal record 20.8%  (60)  
 Defendant claims innocence in plea refusal 
No 61.6% ( 178) 
Yes 38.4%  (111) 
 Jury thinks case close 
No 50.2% (145) 
Yes 49.8% (144) 
 Judge thinks case close 
No 45.9% (133) 
Yes 53.1% (153) 
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Table 1 
(continued) 
Variable Mean SD Min 
Percent jury black 
Max 
25.69 25.53 0 100 
Severity of charge 03.80 02.21 1 008 
Number prosecution 
witnesses & exhibits 
20.36 24.42 1 235 
Number defense 
witnesses & exhibits 
06.27 11.99 0 102 
Jury sentiment 
about law 
02.39 00.77 1 007 
Jury sentiment to 
defendant 
03.21 00.84 1 007 
21% of the cases, the defendant does not have a criminal record and in 38% 
of the cases, the defendant asserts his innocence as the reason that he will 
not accept a plea bargain. 
On a scale of 1 to 7 measuring jury sentiment toward the law (with 1 
indicating the law is the most fair and 7 indicating the law is the least fair) 
and jury sentiment toward the defendant (with 1 indicating the least 
sympathy or concern for the defendant and 7 indicating the most sympathy 
or concern for the defendant), juries on average rated the law and legally 
correct outcome as a 2.39 and their sentiment toward the defendant as a 
3.21.   Judges are slightly more likely to indicate that a case is close on the 
evidence than juries.  In the 289 cases analyzed here, the jury indicates that 
the case is close on the evidence 50% of the time while the judge believes 
this to be true in 53% of the cases. 
The distribution of measures varies across cases with different levels 
of judge and jury agreement.  We conducted chi-square tests for 
independence and analyses of variance to examine differences in the 
independent variables across the four case outcomes (statistically significant 
differences are noted in Table 2).  Case outcomes varied significantly across 
courts.  Judges and juries agreed on the case outcome (conviction or 
acquittal) 89% of the time in Los Angeles and 87% of the time in Maricopa, 
but only 65% of the time in the Bronx and D.C. respectively.  Juries in the 
Bronx were more than twice as likely to have acquitted when the judge 
would have convicted compared to Los Angeles and four times more likely 
to do so compared to juries in Maricopa County.  Juries in Washington, 
D.C. were the most likely to acquit when the judge would have convicted, 
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Table 2 
Bivariate Relationships Between Independent Variables and Case 
Outcomes 













Site***     
Los Angeles 78.5% 09.2% 10.8% 01.5% 
Maricopa 69.6% 05.1% 17.7% 07.6% 
Bronx 51.5% 22.7% 13.6% 12.1% 
D.C. 55.8% 31.2% 09.1% 03.9% 
Race**     
Non-black 60.9% 13.5% 17.3% 08.3% 
Black 66.7% 19.9% 09.0% 04.5% 
Quality of defense***     
No witnesses or 
defendant testifies alone 75.5% 10.8% 07.2% 06.5% 
Witness testifies alone 
or with defendant 53.3% 22.7% 18.0% 06.0% 
Prior criminal history***     
Defendant has criminal 
record 69.8% 13.5% 12.1% 04.7% 
Defendant does not have 
criminal record 43.3% 30.0% 18.3% 08.3% 
Defendant claims 
innocent*** 
    
No 73.0% 14.0% 06.7% 06.2% 
Yes 49.5% 21.6% 22.5% 06.3% 
Judge thinks case  
close*** 
    
No 75.9% 09.5% 10.2% 04.4% 
Yes 53.3% 23.3% 15.3% 08.0% 
* p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01 

















Jury thinks case close  ***    
No 87.8% 03.6% 04.3% 04.3% 
Yes 36.9% 30.6% 22.4% 07.5% 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Percent jury black
Mean 
23.72 ** 36.35 22.29 21.92 





18.12 13.28 14.63 
Number defense 
witnesses & exhibits 
06.52 05.36 06.97 04.94 




02.80 02.56 02.74 




02.98 02.90 03.51 
with disagreements three times the rate of those in Los Angeles and six 
times that of Maricopa County.  Disagreements in the direction of juror 
liberation were also more common when the defendant was black (20% of 
cases resulted in jury acquittal when judge would have convicted compared 
to only 14% when the defendant was another race) and when a higher 
proportion of the jury members are black.  There were no significant 
differences in case outcomes with various levels of charge severity. 
The quantity of the evidence, measured by the numbers of witnesses 
presented by the prosecution has a significant, but rather moderate, effect 
on case outcomes.  The average number of witnesses and exhibits presented 
by the prosecution is higher in cases where the judge and jury agree on guilt 
(an average of 23 prosecution witnesses and exhibits) than those cases 
where the judge and jury agree on acquittal (an average of 13 prosecution 
witnesses and exhibits) or the jury disagrees with the judge (an average of 
18 prosecution witnesses and exhibits in liberation cases).  The number of 
witnesses and exhibits presented by the defense is not significantly related 
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to the case outcome.  The quality of the defense presented, however, does 
affect whether or not the judge and jury agree.  When the defense presents a 
weak case (either no witnesses testify or only the defendant testifies as a 
witness) the judge and jury agreement about guilt is quite robust (76%).  
When the defense presents a stronger case (defense witnesses testify alone 
or in combination with the defendant), agreement about conviction drops to 
53%.  Juries are twice as likely to acquit when the judge would have 
convicted in cases where the defense presents a witness other than or in 
addition to the defendant.  Not surprisingly, the judge and jury are most the 
likely to agree about acquittal in those cases where the defendant and a 
supporting witness testify together. 
The findings from the NCSC data reveal that the defendant’s lack of a 
criminal history significantly predicts judge and jury disagreement about 
conviction.  Judges and juries were significantly more likely to agree about 
the case outcome in those cases in which the defendant had a criminal 
history (agreeing to convict 70% of the time).  When the defendant did not 
have a criminal history, agreement on conviction dropped to 43%, and 30% 
of these cases resulted in jury acquittals when the judge would have 
convicted.  In fact, judges disagreed with the jury’s decision to acquit 
defendants without a criminal history two-thirds of the time, suggesting that 
the lack of a criminal history may have moved juries towards acquittal in 
many cases in which judges believed the defendant to be guilty. 
The NCSC data provides a unique opportunity to explore the 
relationship between the defendant’s reason for refusing to plead guilty and 
jury outcomes.  Although juries were unlikely to know the reason the 
defendant refused to plead, a defendant’s claim of innocence to his or her 
attorney has a strong positive effect on jury acquittal.  Juries acquitted in 
44% of all cases in which the defendant did not plead because he insisted he 
was innocent; judges agreed with the jury that the defendant was not guilty 
in half of these cases.  Perhaps defendants insist that they are innocent in 
order to encourage their lawyer to behave vigorously on their behalf.  
Perhaps they insist on their innocence although they know themselves to be 
guilty because they believe that the state has a weak case.  However, a 
defendant sophisticated enough to claim innocence in order to manipulate 
his lawyer may well be sophisticated enough to know the risks of insisting 
upon trial should he be convicted.  His lawyer will tell him that if he is 
convicted after trial, the judge may increase his sentence beyond what he 
would have received if he pled and may increase it even more if he takes 
the stand and insists unsuccessfully upon his own innocence.71
 
71 Cf. Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility 
and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2000). 
  Defendants 
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may also decline a plea bargain on the grounds of innocence because they 
are, in fact, innocent.  At a minimum, juries—who are ignorant of plea 
offers and their refusal—respond more positively to defendants who refuse 
to plead on this ground. 
Jury sentiments about the law and the defendant also differed 
significantly by case outcomes.  Not surprisingly, juries felt the law and 
legally correct outcome were most fair in those cases where they agreed 
with the judge on conviction (average rating of 2.22 on a scale of 1 to 7 
where 1 is most fair and 7 is least fair).  The jury felt the law as well as the 
legally correct outcome was least fair in liberation cases, when they 
acquitted and the judge would have convicted (average rating of 2.80).  
Contrary to Kalven and Zeisel’s liberation hypothesis, we find the juries’ 
concern and sympathy for the defendant appears to be reserved for those 
cases where the defendant is convicted.  Juries had the least amount of 
sympathy for the defendant or concern about the consequences of a 
conviction (measured on a scale of 1 to 7 where a score of 1 represents the 
least sympathy or concern and 7 represents the most sympathy or concern) 
in those cases where they acquitted (either with or without the judge’s 
agreement).  It is possible that the jury does not worry about the 
consequences to the defendant in cases in which they acquit because their 
action benefits rather than harms the defendant. 
The liberation hypothesis rests upon the notion that cases that are close 
on the evidence free jurors to consider sentiment.  Unlike Kalven and 
Zeisel’s data, which only allowed for examination of the judge’s 
perspective of the closeness of a case, the NCSC data provides information 
from both the judge and the jury about the degree to which they believe the 
case is close on the evidence.  Not surprisingly, jury assessment of case 
closeness is more predictive of acquittal than judicial assessment.  When 
the jury indicates that the case is close on the evidence, they acquit 53% of 
the time compared to only 8% of the time when they do not think the case is 
close on the evidence.  When judges think the case is close, the jury acquits 
in only 39% of the cases compared to 20% when the judge does not think 
the case is close. 
The NCSC data confirms that close cases breed judge and jury 
disagreement.  When judges think cases are close on the evidence, the jury 
agrees with the judge on the case outcome in only 69% of the cases 
(compared to 86% agreement when the judge thinks the evidence is clear).  
Turning to jury assessments of closeness, we find the gap in agreement 
about case outcomes to be even wider.  When juries think the case is close 
on the evidence, they agree with the judge 59% of the time: in 37% of the 
cases they agree that the defendant is guilty while in 22% of the cases they 
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cases are close on the evidence they agree with the judge that the defendant 
is guilty 87% of the time and that the defendant is not guilty 4% of the time 
(for a total agreement of 91%). 
We now turn to the heart of our inquiry—examining if and how 
evidentiary and non-evidentiary factors explain disagreements between 
judges and juries.  Our particular interest is examining whether “jury 
sentiment” toward the law and the defendant can be identified as an 
explanation for judge–jury disagreement in the modern NCSC data.  Since 
case outcome is a multi-category variable representing judge and jury 
agreement or disagreement about conviction or acquittal, here, we use 
multinomial regression analysis to help isolate the degree to which 
variables illustrative of jury sentiment affect outcomes in those cases in 
which judges and juries disagree on the verdict.  In order to arrive at some 
understanding of the role of sentiment, we also examine the effect of a 
range of other possible contributors to disagreement.  We calculate three 
multinomial models to predict the independent effect of evidence and jury 
sentiment on case outcomes.  The first model predicts the effect of evidence 
and jury sentiment on outcomes excluding measures of judge and jury 
evaluation of whether or not the case was close.  The second model 
examines the effects of evidence and juror sentiment controlling for judge 
assessment of the case closeness while the third model controls for jury 
perceptions of case closeness.  In all three models, the comparison category 
for the dependent variable is judge and jury agreement on conviction, 
meaning that the coefficients for agreement on acquittal and disagreement 
on conviction or acquittal are measured against agreement on conviction.  
The results from the multinomial models are set forth in Table 3.  To 
simplify the presentation of results, the outcomes for cases indicative of the 
liberation hypothesis (where the jury acquits when the judge would have 
convicted) are highlighted in grey and a majority of the discussion of 
findings centers around predictors of these “liberation” cases. 
Model 1 indicates some difference in judge–jury agreement between 
study sites.  Cases in Maricopa and Los Angeles cases were less likely than 
cases in Washington D.C. (the reference category) to result in jury 
acquittals when the judge would have convicted.  As demonstrated in 
previous research,72
 
72 Givelber & Farrell, supra note 
 when the defendant had no criminal record juries were 
more likely to acquit when judges would convict as compared to agreement 
on conviction (b=1.996, p=.001).  While the total number of prosecution 
and defense witnesses did not strongly predict judge and jury disagreement, 
judges and juries were significantly more likely to agree on acquittal when 
the defense presented a strong case in terms of having a supporting witness 
51, at 40–43 & tbl.2. 
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testify (alone or in combination with the defendant, b=1.450, p=.010) and 
when the defendant claimed he was innocent (b=1.344, p=.005).  One 
possible explanation for both phenomena is that defendants most likely 
insist upon innocence in those cases where there is strong evidentiary basis 
for doing so.  Moreover, a defense lawyer with a client insisting on 
innocence and witnesses to help prove his case may be more energized to 
put on an effective defense.  There are no significant effects of defendant 
race, jury race, or charge severity on differences in case outcomes. 
Since we hypothesized that jury sentiment would distinguish cases 
where judges and juries disagree on the outcome, we should anticipate a 
significant relationship between jury sentiment variables (belief that the law 
is unfair and sympathy for the defendant) and the coefficients for 
disagreement in the multinomial models.  Specifically, we should find the 
strongest positive relationship between both sentiment variables and jury 
acquittals occurring in liberation cases—where the judge would convict 
when the jury acquits.  Model 1 illustrates that jury sentiment toward the 
law has a significant positive effect on all examined outcomes.  That is, 
when juries perceive the law or the correct legal outcome to be unfair, it is 
significantly more likely that (a) the jury will acquit even if the judge would 
convict (b=.928, p=.003), (b) the judge and jury will agree on acquittal 
(b=.827, p=.008), or (c) the judge will indicate that she would have 
acquitted even if the jury convicts (b=1.095, p=.005) than it is that (d) the 
jury will convict and the judge agrees.  Therefore, while sentiment toward 
the law does predict disagreement, it also significantly predicts judge and 
jury agreement about acquittal.  Contrary to the prediction of the liberation 
hypothesis, in the cases where the jury expresses sympathy for the 
defendant, jurors are less likely to acquit when the judge would convict (b=-
.967, p=.002) than they are to agree with the judge that the defendant is 
guilty.  As we suggested earlier, this may be because juries feel less 
sympathy for a defendant whom they are going to acquit. 
Adding judicial perception of case-closeness into the second model, 
we find that cases are not more likely to result in disagreement when the 
judge indicates that the case is close on the evidence than otherwise.  More 
importantly, adding judge perceptions about the closeness of the case does 
not dramatically alter the relationships between jury sentiment and case 
outcomes observed in Model 1.  However, adding jury perceptions of case-
closeness in Model 3 both improves the strength of the model and changes 
the effect of some important predictors of disagreement.  Initially, the 
amount of variance explained in the model increases when jury perceptions 
of closeness are included (pseudo r-square measures improve from .48 in 
Model 1 and Model 2 to .59 in Model 3).  Jury perception of closeness also 
significantly predicts judge and jury disagreement (acquitting when the 
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judge would convict, b=3.364, p=.000) and jury agreement with the judge 
on acquittal (b=2.703, p=.000).  Evidentiary factors such as the defendant’s 
lack of a criminal history still strongly predict judge and jury disagreement 
(b=2.509, p=.000), but jury sentiment toward the law is no longer a 
significant predictor of judge–jury disagreement.  While jury sentiment 
toward the defendant remains a significant predictor of judge–jury 
disagreement, the direction of the effect is opposite to that predicted by the 
liberation hypothesis. 
The liberation hypothesis posits that jurors who disagreed with the 
judge by acquitting someone the judge believed guilty were responding to 
sentiment in cases that were close on the evidence.  If this proposition holds 
true today, we should expect that the effects of jury sentiment toward the 
law and the defendant should be strongest in those cases that are close on 
the evidence.  We test this contention directly by partitioning the NCSC 
data by both judge perceptions of closeness (close or clear) and jury 
perceptions of closeness (close or clear) and reexamining the effects of jury 
sentiment on case outcomes in close and clear cases separately.  As we 
noted in the discussion of Table 2, cases that the jury believes are clear 
generally generate agreement between the judge and jury and cases that are 
close generate disagreement.  This does not necessarily mean that we can 
assume “sentiment” is more influential in close cases than it is in clear 
cases.  Indeed, sentiment may affect jury decisionmaking in different ways 
in cases that either the judge or the jury believes are close compared to 
those that are believed to be clear.  Although nearly one-quarter of the 
instances of judge–jury disagreements identified in The American Jury 
occurred in cases that the judge believed to be clear on the evidence, Kalven 
and Zeisel never analyzed these cases separately to determine whether or 
not jury sentiment also predicted judge–jury disagreement in clear cases.73
 
73 Because the second survey was the one which asked the judge whether the case was 
“close” or “clear,” it seems likely that the figures about disagreement in “clear” cases are 
based on that survey.  They do not discuss disagreements in “clear” cases as a distinct 
category although they note that as a matter of theory disagreements in “clear” cases should 
be disagreements based exclusively on values, a phenomenon which they identify as 
occurring in 24% of all cases in both surveys.  They note that the second survey indicated 
that disagreements occurred in 25% of all cases that the judge designated as clear.  Id. at 
164 n.2.  The figure for all disagreements (both normal and cross-over) in Kalven and Zeisel 
was 22%.  See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 
  
The present analysis attempts to remedy this omission, providing a more 
complete evaluation of the role of jury sentiments play in predicting judge 
and jury disagreement in both close and clear cases. 
4, at 58 tbl.12. 
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Multinomial models predicting the effects of evidentiary and jury 
sentiment measures on case outcomes74 for cases that judges indicate are 
“not close” and cases that judges indicate are “close” on the evidence75 are 
displayed in the first two columns of Table 4.  As suggested by the 
liberation hypothesis, when the judge considered the case to be close on the 
evidence, jury sentiment about the fairness of the law predicts that the jury 
will acquit when the judge would convict (b=.702, p=.027).  Sentiment, 
however, is not the only significant predictor of judge jury disagreement in 
cases that judges indicate are close on the evidence.  The defendant’s lack 
of a criminal record also significantly predicts judge–jury disagreement in 
the direction of liberation (b=1.101, p=.043), suggesting both sentiment and 
evidentiary factors influence juries to acquit when judges would convict in 
cases that judges believe are close on the evidence.  Interestingly, jury 
sentiment about the defendant and the lack of a defendant’s criminal history 
also predict judge–jury disagreement in cases that the judge indicates are 
not close on the evidence, indicating that evidence and sentiment may also 
be at work in clear cases as well.76
The last two columns of Table 4 present the effect of measures of 
evidence and jury sentiment on judge–jury disagreement in cases the jury 
thinks are not close compared to cases the jury thinks are close on the 
evidence.  While jury sentiment about the law predicted judge–jury 
disagreement when the judge thought the case was close, there is no 
relationship between jury sentiment about the law or the defendant and case 
 
 
74 To simplify the interpretation the partitioned multinomial model results, we collapsed 
case outcomes into three categories: judge and jury agree about conviction or acquittal 
(reference category), judge would convict when jury acquits, and judge would acquit when 
jury convicts.  The strength and direction of key measures are then same when agreement 
cases are separated into agreement on acquittal and agreement on conviction (as presented in 
Table 3) and results from these more complex models are available upon request from 
authors.  Models show here are also limited to key variables measuring evidence and jury 
sentiment. 
75 Judges and juries were each asked to rate the degree to which the evidence favored the 
prosecution or defense on a 1 to 7 scale (1 indicating evidence favored the prosecution and 7 
indicating evidence favored defense).  The responses were recoded into not close (coded 0 
when the judge or jury indicated an answer at the ends of the scale of 1–2 or 6–7), and close 
(coded 1 when the judge or jury indicated an answer in the middle of the scale of 3, 4, or 5). 
76 We used a coefficient comparison test to examine differences in the coefficients across 
partitioned close and not close models for judges and juries (for more information about the 
z-value test.  See Raymond Paternoster et al., Using the Correct Statistical Test for the 
Equality of Regression Coefficients, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 859, 859. (1998) (computation of Z = 
b1 – b2/√ SEb12 + SEb22).  While the strength of some evidentiary and jury sentiment 
measures differed between cases that judges thought were close compared to those cases that 
judges did not think were close, none of these differences were large enough to be 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2010] WHY JUDGES AND JURIES DISAGREE ABOUT GUILT 1583 
outcomes in those cases that the jury thinks are close on the evidence.  The 
only variable that predicts judge–jury disagreement in the direction of 
liberation in cases that the jury thinks are close on the evidence is a 
defendant’s lack of a criminal record (b=1.342, p=.009).  Jurors, then, were 
least likely to be influenced by sentiment in the very cases that the 
liberation hypothesis suggests that sentiment should matter most—when 
they believed the case to be close on the evidence.  While jury sentiments 
toward the law and to a lesser degree (and in the opposite direction of that 
predicted by Kalven and Zeisel) toward the defendant help predict cases 
where the jury and judge disagree about guilt generally, these factors only 
predict disagreement in a limited number of cases.  Specifically, sentiment 
toward the law only predicts liberation (jury acquittal when the judge would 
convict) in cases where the judge thinks the evidence is close and sentiment 
toward the defendant negatively predicts liberation only in cases that judges 
believe are not close on the evidence.  Jury sentiment toward the law or the 
defendant has no effect on case outcomes when the jury considers the case 
close.  While this result seems logical—sentiments should help explain why 
judge and jury disagree when one or the other of them considers the case to 
be clear—it provides little support for a theory that suggests evidentiary 
uncertainty triggers the jury’s retreat to sentiment.  Ultimately, the strongest 
and most consistent predictor of jury acquittal in opposition to a judge’s 
vote for conviction is a defendant without a criminal record.  At least in the 
NCSC data, the evidentiary factor of a criminal history has a much stronger 
influence than jury sentiment in predicting judge–jury disagreements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study has explored the question “What accounts for judge and 
jury disagreement about guilt?” with a particular focus upon whether jury 
sentiments about the defendant and the law offer a significant explanation 
of the phenomenon.  Kalven and Zeisel explained disagreements in part 
through the liberation hypothesis that juries, in close cases, resorted to 
sentiment in deciding whether the defendant was guilty.  Empirical research 
over the past forty years has been unable to replicate these findings, 
offering mixed evaluations of the role to which jury sentiment as opposed 
to evidentiary factors explain cases in which the jury acquits defendants 
whom the judge would have convicted.  To see whether we could find 
evidence of this phenomenon at work, we looked at the data from a four-
jurisdiction survey of criminal trials, undertaken for the explicit purpose of 
analyzing hung juries but employing survey instruments and techniques 
permitting inquiry into a broader set of questions.  While earlier research 
analyzing this data confirmed that contemporary juries, like those studied 
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by Kalven and Zeisel, were more acquittal prone than judges,77
The results presented here should not be completely surprising.  There 
should be some reason that a jury refuses to decide a case in the way that 
the judge considers to be clear.  It is interesting, but ultimately unsatisfying, 
to speculate as to why Kalven and Zeisel did not discuss disagreements in 
“clear” cases as separate categories.  While they explicitly eschew the role 
of advocate for or against the jury system, their work stands as a powerful 
and reassuring testament to the justice of the jury system, as the many 
judicial citations to it testify.
 our analysis 
indicates that sentiments, as measured by the NCSC study, do not provide a 
particularly meaningful explanation of the tendency of the jury to acquit 
when the judge would convict.  We find that contrary to the liberation 
hypothesis, which indicates juries will resort to sentiment when the 
evidence is close, jury sentiment toward the law has only has only a limited 
effect in those cases where the judge believes the evidence is close.  Indeed, 
jury sentiment toward the law or the defendant is least likely to play a role 
in the very situation in which the theory suggests it would have greatest 
effect—when the jury finds the case close on the evidence. 
78
This conclusion requires a number of qualifications.  First, since the 
NCSC study did not ask judges why juries disagree with them as to guilt, 
we do not know whether contemporary judges would offer the same 
explanation of disagreements that their counterparts offered in the 1950s.  If 
the NCSC asked the same questions as Kalven and Zeisel, perhaps it would 
have received the same answers.  Regardless, the NCSC data provides 
superior measures of the factors that actually affect jury decisions and the 
results presented here would still provide no support for the view that it is 
particularly when the jury considers a case close that it will turn to 
sentiment to decide the case.  Additionally, the NCSC data is limited in a 
number of ways that constrain the generalizability of our findings.  The data 
  Perhaps they considered that an extensive 
treatment of cases in which a jury’s decision apparently flies in the face of 
evidence would have undercut their message.  Whatever the reason, the data 
presented here reveals, as did Kalven and Zeisel’s survey forty years earlier, 
that there are a small but persistent fraction of jury trials that result in 
verdicts that the judge considers to be counterfactual.  The explanation for 
these disagreements, however, appears to be more complex than the 
liberation hypothesis suggests.  In the face of evidentiary uncertainty, juries 
do not appear to retreat to sentiment; rather, a more complex process of 
weighing the value of evidence, including the criminal record of the 
defendant appears to explain such disagreements. 
 
77 Eisenberg et al, supra note 11, at 181. 
78 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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include a relatively small number of criminal trials occurring in only four 
jurisdictions, all of which are in urban settings.  As a result, the findings 
from this study, and concerns raised about the role of jury sentiment, may 
not be generalizable to different types of locations. 
It is possible, of course, that sentiment plays a significant role in 
leading a juror to consider the case close on the evidence but that the jurors 
who responded to the NCSC study were unaware of this subtle influence on 
their perceptions.  They answered in light of the vote they had just cast, and 
they understood their vote in terms of resolving a factual dispute rather than 
permitting sentiment to outweigh the conclusion that the facts demanded.  
One could imagine that jurors might be more aware of the role of sentiment 
when they chose to acquit despite clear evidence of guilt.  Accepting both 
of these premises, the findings presented here would not undermine the 
liberation hypothesis but would not provide support for the view that factual 
uncertainty opens a juror’s mind to consider sentiment rather than the other 
way around.  We cannot discount the possibility that the juror’s failure to 
acknowledge the role of sentiment in the liberation outcome reflected their 
inability to understand their own emotions rather than the absence of those 
emotions.  However, we can suggest that, if this is the case, it has yet to be 
demonstrated convincingly.  In our view, the data rather supports the less 
exciting possibility that, in close cases, jurors acquit because they believe 
that, on the evidence presented, the state has failed to persuade them of the 
defendant’s guilt.  In fact, the evidentiary factor of a defendant without a 
criminal history is the strongest predictor of judge and jury disagreement in 
cases that both judges and juries indicate are close on the evidence. 
The liberation hypothesis suggests that when juries disagree with 
judges, they do so out of emotion, invoked in those cases that are close on 
the evidence.  This hypothesis has remained largely untested for over forty 
years and arguably has supported commonly held impressions about the 
unique role of the American jury—that in the face of evidentiary 
uncertainty, jurors employ personal and community sentiment to arrive at 
acquittals of defendants whom judges believe to be guilty.  The findings 
presented here suggest that that when juries decide to acquit in cases in 
which judges would have convicted, they do not arrive at this decision 
because of sentiment, but rather do so because they evaluate the evidence 
differently than judges.  Thus, we should understand differences between 
judges and juries not as evidence of the jury’s “flight from the law,” but 
rather as an indication that judges and juries rationally evaluate the same 
evidence but arrive at different conclusions based on their unique vantage 
points. 
Ultimately, it is less important to understand why judges and juries 
disagree than to understand who is correct in those cases where they do 
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disagree.  Even if juries are not moved by sentiment, it is still possible that 
judges do a better job than juries do at evaluating credibility and weighing 
the evidence.  If so, it may be that the judge’s conclusion as to guilt or 
innocence is the one that reflects the most accurate application of law to 
fact.  There is no way to answer that question definitively.  However, we 
can answer the question of whether the jury arrives at conclusions different 
from the judge in close cases because they are unusually susceptible to 
sentiment in such cases.  The answer to that question (at least as measured 
by the data presented here) is “no.”  This finding has important implications 
for how we think about the meaning of acquittals.  If courts and other 
criminal justice professionals are going to continue to treat jury acquittals as 
irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant committed the crime, 
they are going to need a firmer base than the belief that juries are moved by 
sentiment and judges by fact. 
 
